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ITS POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
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MICHAEL LYNCH*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine what it would feel like to be hungry—starving. After
making it through an entire day without a morsel, you finally get
the opportunity to eat late in the evening. You are relieved and
grateful when you realize that your neighborhood grocery store is
still open for a bit longer.
You enter the store and begin walking through the aisles looking
for all of the ingredients you need to create a satisfying meal. You
walk up to an employee and ask for assistance in finding an item,
but he only stares at you and does not speak. You ask once again,
in a louder voice, but he still does nothing to help you find your
item. You approach other employees, hoping they will assist you,
but no one is able to help you. Despite not finding the item you
need, you are grateful for the food in your shopping cart and decide
to check out.
You begin placing items near the register, but the employee does
not complete the transaction . . . she looks at you and tells you that
she cannot ring you up because she does not know how to do that.
You walk out of the store tired, frustrated and still starving.
Fortunately, this is not typical of how most experience grocery
stores. Customers are able to rely on store employees to assist
them when needed. Some customers may need more help than
others, and the employees do their best to assist all their
customers. As a result, almost all people who enter grocery stores
are able to successfully purchase food. However, education
*

St. John’s University School of Law J.D. Candidate, 2016.

31

LYNCH, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

32

11/8/2017 2:25 PM

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1

statutes in some states protect teachers who are as ineffective as
the hypothetical grocery store employees described above. In too
many schools across the United States, students are walking
through the doors, sitting in classrooms, but leaving without an
education. They are leaving schools starved.
Ineffective teachers can set their students back immeasurably,
and have a substantial negative effect on students’ lifetime
earnings.1 Successful teachers can have deep positive impacts and
they admittedly deserve a degree of job security, but some states
have enacted employment protections that make it prohibitively
time consuming and expensive to remove poor teachers.2 These
protections are even more burdensome in low-income districts that
do not have the time and resources needed to fire ineffective
teachers.3 As a result, there is a disproportionately large number
of ineffective teachers in low-income school districts.4
Recently, in Vergara v. California,5 the California Superior
Court examined the state constitutionality of several teacher
employment protection statutes. The plaintiffs claimed that the
California state laws were preventing the dismissal of severely
inadequate teachers.6 Additionally, ineffective teachers were
“disproportionately situated in schools serving predominately low-

1 See Karen Weise, One Year With a Bad Teacher Costs Each Student $50,000 in
Lifetime
Earnings,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(Jun.
12,
2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-12/one-year-with-a-bad-teacher-costs-eachstudent-50-000-in-lifetime-earnings.
2 See Evan Thomas & Pat Wingert, Why We Can’t Get Rid of Failing Teachers,
NEWSWEEK , Mar. 15, 2010, at 25 (“In most states, after two or three years, teachers are
given lifetime tenure. It is almost impossible to fire them.”). See also Susan Edelman &
Michael Gartland, It’s Nearly Impossible to Fire Tenured Teachers, NY POST (Jun. 14, 2014),
http://nypost.com/2014/06/14/tenured-teachers-they-cheat-they-loaf-they-cant-be-fired/
(criticizing the difficult process required to dismiss a tenured teacher New York State).
3 In New York City, the average cost to remove a tenured teacher is $250,000. See Frank
Eltman, Firing Tenured Teachers Isn’t Just Difficult, it Costs You, USA TODAY (Jun. 30,
2008),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/education/2008-06-30-teacher-tenurecosts_N.htm;
see
also
Should
Teachers
Get
Tenure?,
PROCON.ORG,
http://teachertenure.procon.org/ (last updated Apr. 4, 2016) (Procon.org is a nonprofit public
charity “[p]romoting critical thinking, education, and informed citizenship by presenting
controversial issues in a straightforward, nonpartisan, primarily pro-con format”).
4 See Rose Garrett, What is Teacher Tenure, EDUCATION.COM (Jun. 24, 2013),
http://www.education.com/magazine/article/what-is-teacher-tenure/ (citing the results of a
survey conducted by The New Teacher Project (TNTP) in which 81 percent of public school
administrators said there is a poor-performing tenured teacher in their school).
5 No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 (Cal. Super. Jun. 10, 2014).
6 Id. at *2.
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income and minority students.”7 Because of the inequality across
race and income in the distribution of effective teachers, the
plaintiffs argued that the challenged statutes violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the California Constitution.8 Specifically, the
plaintiffs asserted that the statutes infringed on “their
fundamental rights to equality of education by adversely affecting
the quality of the education they are afforded by the state.”9
In its decision, the court found all of the challenged statutes to
be unconstitutional.10 Using the “strict scrutiny” level of analysis,
the court found that California did not prove that the challenged
statutes were “necessary” in the furtherance of a “compelling
interest” pursued by the state.11 In the final line of the decision,
the court encouraged the California legislature to pass new
statutes that would provide “each child in this state with a
basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality education.”12
Implicit in this holding is the conclusion that some students in
California were not receiving a minimally quality education.
This Note does not scrutinize the Superior Court’s analysis of
California Constitutional law; instead, this Note contemplates a
federal challenge to California teacher employment protection
statutes. Unlike the California Constitution, the United States
Constitution does not literally include, and has not been
interpreted to include, a fundamental right to a quality
education.13 However, the Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez opened the door to
constitutional challenges to educational statutes under the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment if the plaintiffs
possessed two distinct characteristics: (1) their financial status
prevented them from paying for a desired benefit; and (2) they
suffered “an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.”14 Therefore, for the students in Vergara to be
successful in federal court, they would have to prove (1) that
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *7.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973); see also
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1955).
14 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20.
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grossly ineffective teachers are located in predominantly lowincome neighborhoods where it is too costly to remove them and
(2) that their presence in the low-income school districts has
created “an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity” to
receive an education.
Part II of this Note discusses the Vergara opinion in greater
depth and examines the legal precedent discussed to assess the
likelihood of a Supreme Court challenge in the future. Part III of
this Note examines some of the relevant empirical data related to
the interplay between race, income, and teacher performance.
Examples from across the country are used to explore whether
overly protective employment statutes have a disproportionately
negative impact on minority students. Next, part IV will take a
look at the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize education as
a fundamental right, and the barriers to a federal constitutional
challenge to the California laws. However, in Part V, this Note
argues that the Vergara case demonstrates a sufficiently egregious
deprivation of educational benefits to allow for a federal Equal
Protection Claim to succeed. In this part, the Rodriguez “loophole”
is explained and the idea of “denial of education” is developed and
applied to the facts of the Vergara case. Finally, in Part VI, this
Note suggests modifications to teacher employment statutes that
would break the stronghold of grossly ineffective teachers on lowincome school districts and honor the Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause.
II.

VERGARA V. CALIFORNIA

In Vergara v. California15, the plaintiffs were nine Los Angeles
Unified School District students who claimed that California’s
teacher employment protection statutes were allowing inadequate
and grossly ineffective teachers to remain in the classroom in
violation of California’s Constitution.16 Because of these overly
protective laws, incapable teachers stifled student achievement
yet survived district initiated layoffs, while promising newer
teachers were dismissed regardless of their superior ability.17 In
15 No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 (Cal. Super. Jun. 10, 2014).
16 Id. at *2.
17 Id. at *6.
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addition, school districts were unable to terminate tenured
teachers because California law made it virtually impossible to fire
even the worst performing teachers.18
The students challenged five statutes in the California
Education Code.19 First, the “Permanent Employment Statute”
required teachers to be evaluated for tenure within two years of
being hired.20 Because of administrative considerations and red
tape, tenure decisions for new teachers were made less than
sixteen months after beginning work. 21 Second, the students
challenged three “Dismissal Statutes” that made removal of
grossly ineffective teachers time consuming and expensive.22 The
entire process can take between two and ten years and can cost
districts between $50,000 to $450,000 to remove a tenured
teacher.23 Finally, the students argued that the “Last-in-FirstOut” (“LIFO”) statute violated the California Constitution.24 The
LIFO statute requires that the last-hired teacher is the first
person fired when layoffs occur, regardless of teacher
effectiveness.25
Both sides agreed that the most important component of
students’ development and learning is quality teaching.26
According to the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr.
Thomas Kane,27 one grossly ineffective math teacher in Los
Angeles can set students back a year behind peers taught by an
average quality math teacher.28 Another expert witness, Dr. Raj
18 Id. at *5.
19 CAL. EDUC. CD. 44929.21(b) (“Permanent Employment Statute”); CAL. EDUC. CD.

44934; CAL. EDUC. CD. 44938(b)(1) and (2); CAL. EDUC. CD. 44944 (“Dismissal Statutes”);
CAL. EDUC. CD. 44955 (“Last-In-First Out (LIFO)”).
20 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (Deering 2016).
21 Vergara
v. California Trial by the Numbers, STUDENTS MATTER,
http://studentsmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/SM_Trial-ByNumbers_06.09.141.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
22 Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *2.
23 Id. at *5.
24 Id. at *2.
25 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (Deering 2016).
26 Id. at *4.
27 Dr. Thomas Kane is a professor of Education and Economics at the Harvard
Graduate School of Education and also the Faculty Director of the Harvard Center for
Education Policy and Research. Defense Witness Concedes That the Probationary Period
Should Be Three to Five Years, STUDENTS MATTER (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://studentsmatter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/SM_Day28_EndofDayPressRelease_03.18.14.pdf.
28 See STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21.
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Chetty,29 estimated that a single grossly ineffective teacher causes
a student to lose $50,000 in potential lifetime earnings.30 As
evidence of the disproportionate racial distribution of teacher
quality, Dr. Kane testified that in the Los Angeles Unified School
District, African American students were 43 percent more likely
than white students to be taught by an ineffective teacher.31 Dr.
Kane also stated that Latino students are 68 percent more likely
to have an ineffective teacher.32
The plaintiffs produced some striking facts and statistics related
to teacher dismissals in the Los Angeles Unified School District.
In 2010, the district laid off hundreds of its most promising math
and English teachers because of the seniority-based layoff
statute.33 In contrast, only 2.2 of the 275,000 public school
teachers in California are dismissed each year for poor
performance.34 The dismissal procedure for a tenured teacher is
time consuming and expensive for local school districts.35 The
plaintiffs presented evidence of a survey conducted of 68
superintendents, 159 principals, and 391 teachers in California.36
90 percent of superintendents, 89 percent of principals, and 62
percent of teachers agreed that students would be better served if
the dismissal procedure were “easier.”37 A survey conducted by the
National Council on Teacher Quality revealed that 34 percent of
principals in the Los Angeles Unified School District did not

29 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 27, at 2. Dr. Raj Chetty is an economics professor at
Harvard University who uses economic theory to design government policies.
30 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21, at 2. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Why that ruling
against teacher tenure won’t help your schoolchildren, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-why-that-ruling-20140611column.html#page=1.
31 Id. Teachers in the bottom 5% of teacher performance according to California
education statistics are considered “ineffective.”
32 Id.
33 See Jason Felch et al., When layoffs come to L.A. schools, performance doesn’t count,
L.A. TIMES (December 4, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/04/local/la-me-1205teachers-seniority-20101204. Of the teachers laid off, 190 ranked in the top fifth in raising
scores in math and English and more than 400 ranked in the top 40%. Id.
34 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21.
35 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21.
36 2013
California
Educators
Survey
Results,
STUDENTS
MATTER,
http://studentsmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SM_Research-Now-PollResults_03.05.14.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2016).
37 Id.
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attempt to remove an ineffective teacher because the process was
unlikely to result in a dismissal.38
More disturbing is the fact that schools located in the
poorest areas of Los Angeles were disproportionately hurt by the
seniority-based layoffs because most new teachers were hired in
those districts.39 For instance, nearly 10 percent of the teachers in
South Los Angeles schools were laid off, which was almost double
the rate in other areas of Los Angeles.40 Overall, of the sixteen
schools that lost at least 25 percent of their teachers, 15 were
located in the low-income communities of South or Central Los
Angeles.41 Moreover, removing ineffective teachers in low-income
school districts is sometimes too costly, which further contributes
to the disproportionate number of ineffective teachers in those
districts.42 According to Los Angeles Superintendent Dr. John
Deasy, it costs between $250,000 to $450,000 to dismiss a tenured
teacher.43 Troy Christmas, Oakland Unified School District
Superintendent, estimated the cost of tenured-teacher dismissal
at approximately $50,000 to $400,000.44
The plaintiffs claimed that the teacher employment protection
statutes had a disproportionately negative impact on low-income
minority students, and consequently denied those students equal
protection of their state constitutional right to an education.45 The
California equal protection clause states: “A person may not be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or
denied equal protection of the laws.”46 The Plaintiffs supported
their Equal Protection argument by citing two other sections of the
California Constitution, which identify education as “essential to
the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people” and
demand “common” and “free” schools.47
38 Teacher Quality Roadmap, Improving Policies and Practices in LAUSD, NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY (2011), available at http://studentsmatter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/SM_LAUSD-teacher-quality-roadmap_10.26.11.pdf.
39 Felch et al., supra note 33.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 2598719, at *7 (Cal. Super.).
46 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.
47 CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall
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In reaching its decision, the California court relied upon three
seminal California education cases. In 1971, California students
appealed a dismissal of their lawsuit alleging that the California
education financing system had a disproportionately negative
impact on poor students and violated the Equal Protection clause
of the California Constitution.48 On appeal, the California
Supreme Court recognized education as a “fundamental interest
which cannot be conditioned by wealth,” and used strict scrutiny
in analyzing the constitutionality of the financing system.49 The
court found sufficient evidence to sustain the allegations that the
California school finance system was “not necessary to the
attainment of any compelling state interest” and that it
disproportionately denied students’ right to education on the basis
of wealth in violation of the California Constitution.50 The court
reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for
further proceedings.51
Five years later, Serrano v. Priest (“Serrano II”) was argued on
the merits in the California Supreme Court.52 The court held that
the finance system violated the Equal Protection clause because it
gave “high-wealth districts a substantial advantage” over lowwealth districts.53 Furthermore, the court held that the California
Constitution guarantees all students “equality of educational
opportunity,” and California laws must provide students with
“substantially equal opportunities for learning.”54 However, the
court concluded that the financing system did not violate the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
the Supreme Court did not recognize education as a fundamental
right warranting strict scrutiny.55
In 1991, parents in a California school district filed for
temporary and permanent injunctive relief against the state to
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific … improvement”);
CAL. CONST. art. IX § 5 (“The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each district . . .”).
48 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 590 (1971) (Serrano I).
49 Id. at 589.
50 Id. at 614-15.
51 Id. at 619.
52 18 Cal. 3d 728 (1976).
53 Id. at 748.
54 Id. at 747-48.
55 Id. at 762.
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prevent a massive budget shortfall from closing schools six weeks
early.56 The trial court granted a preliminary injunction requiring
the state to keep schools open until the end of the school year or
“provide the students with a substantially equivalent educational
opportunity.”57 The California Supreme Court upheld the
preliminary injunction, finding that the state “has broad
responsibility to ensure basic educational equality under the
California Constitution.”58 As part of that responsibility,
“California constitutional principles required State assistance to
correct basic ‘interdistrict’ disparities in the system of common
schools, even when the discriminatory effect was not produced by
the purposeful conduct of the State or its agents.”59
The Vergara court applied the constitutional principles
announced in Serrano I, Serrano II, and Butt in its analysis of the
plaintiffs’ claim. However, as the court put it, “[prior education]
cases addressed the issue of a lack of equality of education based
on the discrete facts raised therein, here this Court is directly
faced with issues that compel it to apply these constitutional
principles to the quality of the educational experience.”60
Adhering to precedent, the court held that California’s teacher
protection statutes “impose[d] a real and appreciable impact on
students’ fundamental right to equality of education and that they
impose[d] a disproportionate burden on poor and minority
students.”61
Critiquing each statute individually, the court identified specific
defects that caused the statutes to violate the California
Constitution.
The court pointed out that the Permanent
Employment Statute required only a “brief period” of time to
evaluate teachers for tenure offers and that that period was “not
nearly enough time” for the school districts to make an informed
decision on hiring. As a result, districts offered tenure to teachers
who would not receive tenure had more time been allowed for

56
57
58
59
60

2014).

See Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1244.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 at *2 (Cal. Super. Jun. 10,

61 Id. at *4.
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evaluation.62 California failed to present a “compelling” state
interest to support the constitutionality of the brief period of
evaluation in the Permanent Employment Statute, therefore, the
statute was held unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
clause.63
The court referred to the statutory requirements in California’s
Dismissal Statutes as “uber due process.”64 The court first noted
that the dismissal process for tenured teachers was far more
burdensome than the dismissal process for other state employees
of school districts.65 Although the court recognized that “teachers
should be afforded reasonable due process when their dismissals
are sought” the current system is “so complex, time consuming and
expensive as to make an effective, efficient yet fair dismissal of a
grossly ineffective teacher illusory.”66
Because ineffective
teachers cannot be removed efficiently, there was a “direct, real,
appreciable, and negative impact on a significant number of
California students.”67 Again, the state failed to prove a
compelling interest to support the dismissal statutes and the court
found them unconstitutional.68
Lastly, the court found the LIFO statute unconstitutional
because it impacted poor minority students most significantly and
allowed them to bear the brunt of staffing inequalities.69 To
supporting its holding, the court pointed to evidence suggesting
that a “disproportionate number of under qualified, inexperienced,
out-of-field, and ineffective teachers and administrators” worked
in struggling schools attended by poor and minority students.70
Furthermore, the court called LIFO a “lose-lose” system where

62 Id. at *5. The court also pointed out that, under then-existing law, some qualified
teachers may not have adequate time to demonstrate their effectiveness. Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5; Vivian Ekchian, Chief Labor Negotiator for the
Los Angeles Unified School District, testified that the dismissal of a classified employee
through the Skelly due process costs only $3,400. Dismissal Statutes, STUDENTS MATTER,
available
at
http://studentsmatter.org/our-case/vergara-v-california-casesummary/dismissal-statutes/.
66 Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *6.
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id. at 6.
69 Id. at 7.
70 Id. at 7.
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qualified teachers are fired and ineffective teachers remain in the
classroom.71
The California Superior Court found the teacher protection
statutes unconstitutional by relying on the analysis formulated in
Serrano I, II, and Butt. However, the court conspicuously opened
its decision by quoting the historic Supreme Court case, Brown v.
Board of Education.72 The court focused specifically on the
following language from the Supreme Court opinion:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.73
This excerpt elaborates on the Brown Court’s view that
“education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.”74 Although the Vergara court did not base its
decision on the rule developed in Brown, it was nevertheless
influenced by the Supreme Court’s reasoning pertaining to denial
of equal educational opportunities. Indeed, it is possible that the
choice to open with the language from Brown was a nod to the
potential national implications of the decision. For that to be true,
other states with potentially unconstitutional teacher employment
protection statutes must similarly deny students equal
educational opportunities.
III.

STATISTICS RELATED TO TEACHER EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION STATUES AND THEIR DISPROPORTIONATE
IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME MINORITY STUDENTS ACROSS
THE UNITED STATES

Because a quarter of all African Americans live in poverty,
young African American students are most at risk of having one
or more ineffective teachers.75 Generally, low-income school
71
72
73
74
75

Vergara, 2014 WL 2598719, at *6.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id at 493.
Id.
Suzanne Macartney et al., Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and Hispanic
Groups by State and Place:2007-2011, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVERY BRIEFS, U.S.

LYNCH, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

42

11/8/2017 2:25 PM

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1

districts have higher concentrations of grossly ineffective teachers
while higher-income school districts have fewer poor-performing
teachers.76 In some of these school districts, state laws require
teacher tenure decisions be made before the teacher has two years
of classroom experience.77 However, some argue that this window
of evaluation is too short and that the minimal period necessary
for an accurate evaluation of teacher effectiveness is two full
academic years.78 Due to the confined evaluation period, almost
all teachers are offered tenure because there is not enough data to
determine whether the teachers’ methods are helping the students
learn or not.79
Mississippi is one state where teachers are offered tenure before
they have two years of classroom experience.80 Mississippi has the
largest population of African Americans of any state in the United
States81 and also has the second lowest average high school
graduation rate (63.8 percent in 2009-2010).82 Similarly, in South
Carolina, teachers are also offered tenure before they have two
years of classroom experience.83 In South Carolina, the African
American population is among the largest in the United States84

CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr1117.pdf.
76 Christina Sepe & Marguerite Roza, Ctr. on Reinventing Pub. Educ., The
Disproportionate Impact of Seniority-Based Layoffs on Poor, Minority Students (2010),
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED516845.pdf (“Higher-poverty schools
generally contain more novice, lower-paid teachers, and conversely, lower-poverty schools
tend to cluster more experienced, higher-paid teachers”).
77 Permanent Employment Statute, STUDENTS MATTER, http://studentsmatter.org/ourcase/vergara-v-california-case-summary/permanent-employment-statute/ (asserting that 5
states require 2 years or less of teaching experience before earning tenure: California,
Montana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and New Hampshire).
78 Heather Peske and Katie Haycock, Teacher Inequality, How Poor and Minority
Students Are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality, San Jose University, June 2006 at 8,
available at http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/TQReportJune2006.pdf (“Most
research suggests that teachers are considerably more effective after completing two years
on the job”).
79 Garret, supra note 4 (“Less than 1% of teachers evaluated were found to be
unsatisfactory, according to the TNTP study”).
80 Permanent Employment Statute, STUDENTS MATTER, http://studentsmatter.org/ourcase/vergara-v-california-case-summary/permanent-employment-statute/.
81 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010 (Sept.
2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.
82 Digest of Education Statistics, National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of
Education Sciences, http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_124.asp.
83 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 80.
84 US CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 81.
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and the high school graduation rate is below 70 percent.85
California, Montana, and New Hampshire also require two years
or less of teaching experience before earning tenure.86 Of those
states, only Montana and New Hampshire have average high
school graduation rates above 80 percent.87 But unlike Mississippi
and South Carolina, Montana and New Hampshire have among
the lowest populations of African American students in the
country.88
Once a teacher receives tenure, some states make it almost
impossible to remove that teacher. Due to costly and timeconsuming dismissal processes, low-income districts find it
extremely difficult to remove an ineffective performing teacher. In
New York City, since 2013, of 133 educators taken to trial, the
Department of Education successfully dismissed 37.6 percent of
those teachers, but in 77 cases, employees were found guilty and
received lesser penalties.89 In contrast, higher-income districts
can afford time-consuming dismissal processes and they are less
likely to lose a qualified teacher to another district.90
Additionally, grossly ineffective teachers are often pooled in lowincome school districts. Low-income districts lose effective
teachers to higher-income districts when positions open up, which
contributes to this disparity.91 State laws or district policies that
require all dismissals be based on seniority also contribute to this
pattern.92 In the states where staffing decisions are based solely
on seniority, effective teachers are often released while grossly
85 Digest of Education Statistics, Public High School Graduation Rates (2009-2010),
National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011015.pdf
(stating the percentage was 68.2% in 2009-2010).
86 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 80.
87 National Center for Education Statistics, supra note 82 (Montana: 81.9%, New
Hampshire: 86.3%).
88 US CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 81, at 9 (Montana: .8%, New Hampshire: 1.7%).
89 Susan Edelman & Michael Gartland, It’s nearly impossible to fire tenured teachers,
NEW YORK POST (June 14, 2014, 10:47 pm), http://nypost.com/2014/06/14/tenured-teachersthey-cheat-they-loaf-they-cant-be-fired/.
90 Id.
91 Benjmain A. Lindy, The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining Laws on Student
Achievement: Evidence from A New Mexico Natural Experiment, 120 YALE L.J. 1130, 1173
(2011).
92 See id.; see also Alysha Stein-Manes, Putting Every Student First: The State
Constitutionality of “Last-in, First-Out” Seniority Protections When Economic Layoffs
Disproportionately Impact Poor and Minority Students, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 402
(2014) (arguing that in districts where seniority governs hiring and layoffs, teachers with
more experience choose open position in wealthier, low-minority communities).
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ineffective teachers are protected.93 Twelve states currently make
decisions regarding teacher layoffs based solely on seniority.94 Of
those twelve states, only four (33 percent) have an average high
school graduation rate above 80 percent.95 In contrast, twenty
states prohibit seniority from being the primary criterion
considered in layoff decisions.96 Of those twenty states, nine (45
percent) have average high school graduation rates above 80
percent.97
Although there is not enough evidence to support a clear
national correlation between overly protective teacher
employment statutes and poor student performance, the Vergara
decision has opened up the conversation among education reform
advocates outside of California. However, because California has
recognized education as a fundamental right guaranteed by the
state, the Vergara plaintiffs’ argument can only be replicated in
states with a similar state constitutional assurance and equally
restrictive employment statutes. In one of those states, New York,
a copycat case was filed shortly after the Vergara decision came
down and the case is expected to be decided sometime in 2016.98
Perhaps the mention of Brown in the Vergara decision was a nod
to the potential for a federal Equal Protection challenge, or maybe
93 Alysha Stein-Manes, Putting Every Student First: The State Constitutionality of
“Last-in, First-Out” Seniority Protections When Economic Layoffs Disproportionately
Impact Poor and Minority Students, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389, 402 (2014).
94 ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.177 (2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (Deering 2016); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 302A-609 (2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 161.800 (LexisNexis 2016); MINN.
STAT. § 122A.40 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:28-10 (West 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2510
(Consol. 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 342.934 (2016); 24 PA. CONST. STAT. § 11-1125.1 (2016); 16
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-13-6 (2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18A-2-2 (LexisNexis 2016); WIS. STAT.
§ 118.23 (2016).
95 Public High School Graduation Rates, supra note 85 (naming Minnesota, Wisconsin,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania).
96 Vergara v. California: Last In, First Out Statute, STUDENTS MATTER, (2016),
http://studentsmatter.org/case/vergara/last-in-first-out-statute/ (noting Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington).
97 Public High School Graduation Rates, supra note 85 (naming Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia).
98 Diane C. Lore, Staten Island Judge Rules New York Teacher Tenure Lawsuit Can
Proceed,
SILIVE.COM,
(Oct.
23,
2015,
8:48
PM),
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/10/staten_island_judge_rules_new_1.html. On
October 23, 2015, Justice Philip Minardo of the NYS Supreme Court denied a motion for
summary judgment made by the NYS Teachers Union and ruled that the copy-cat case
would be heard in State Appellate Court in 2016. Id.
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it was included only to reaffirm the basis for California’s
commitment to equal public education. Given the tremendous
importance of education and the national attention paid to this
historic trial court decision in California, it may well be a question
of when, not if, the Vergara case or a case based on the same
principles makes it to the Supreme Court. Still, a question of
national significance remains: Could the Vergara plaintiffs, or
similarly situated students, mount a federal challenge to overly
protective teacher protection statutes?
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT AND EDUCATION AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

A. Supreme Court Precedent on Education and Equal Protection
Although the Vergara decision involves a California court
interpreting California law, the court conspicuously chose to begin
its decision by echoing the Supreme Court’s landmark reasoning
in Brown v. Board of Education. In that decision, the Court held
that education facilities separated by race are inherently unequal
and deny students Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment99 of the U.S. Constitution.100 In reaching its decision,
the Court came close to recognizing education as a fundamental
right by calling education “perhaps the most important function of
state and local government,” and stating “it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.”101
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court further restricted
the right to education. Almost twenty years later in San Antonio
Independent School Disttrict v. Rodriguez, the Court heard a case
that challenged Texas’s system of financing public education
through reliance on local property taxes.102 This system created
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
100 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
101 Id. at 493.
102 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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great disparities in expenditures for education across school
districts.103 The plaintiffs, poor minority students residing in low
property tax districts, claimed this system violated the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.104
The Court applied only intermediate scrutiny105 to the students’
Equal Protection claim and stated that “[i]t is not the province of
this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name
of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”106 The Court made
clear that education is neither a fundamental right contained in
the Constitution, nor a right that is implicitly protected.107
Furthermore, the Court rejected the students’ argument that their
claim deserved a heightened level of judicial analysis because they
were a protected class who suffered a “peculiar disadvantage”
resulting from the school financing system.108 Thus, the Court
held that the Texas system “may not be condemned simply because
it imperfectly effectuates the State’s goals.”109 In addition, the
Court recognized that “reliance on local property taxation for
school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to
expenditures for some districts than for others,” but that “the
existence of ‘some inequality’ in the manner in which the State’s
rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking
down the entire system.”110
The Court’s decision in Rodriguez, and its impact on the quality
of education across the country, was tested less than a decade later
in 1982 in Plyler v. Doe.111 There, the Court heard another
challenge under the Equal Protection clause again by plaintiffs
from Texas.112 Undocumented residents in a Texas school district
alleged that a Texas statute was unconstitutional because it
precluded state education funds from going to a local school
103 Id. at 11.
104 Id. at 1.
105 Id. at 55 (“The constitutional standard under the Equal Protection Clause is

whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or
interest”).
106 Id. at 35.
107 Id. at 33.
108 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
109 Id. at 51.
110 Id. at 50-51.
111 457 U.S. 202, 203 (1982).
112 Id. at 205.
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district that served children who were not “legally admitted” into
United States, and it allowed school districts to deny enrollment
to those children.113 Texas rebutted the plaintiff’s argument by
stating that the statute served the purposes of discouraging illegal
immigration, avoiding burdens on public schools, and preserving
education resources for those likely to stay in the state.114
Ultimately, the Court reaffirmed the Rodriguez Court’s decision
that education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution.115 Thus, strict scrutiny was not utilized, and Texas
did not have to a show a “compelling necessity” for the
disproportionate irregularities in the education system offered to
its population.116 However, the Court paid particular attention to
the indispensability of a quality public education:
The deprivation of public education is not like the
deprivation of some other governmental benefit. Public
education has a pivotal role in maintaining the fabric of our
society and in sustaining our political and cultural heritage:
the deprivation of education takes an inestimable toll on the
social, economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being
of the individual, and poses an obstacle to individual
achievement.117
Because of the severe consequences118 caused by the deprivation
of education, the discriminatory nature of the Texas statute could
only be considered rational if it furthered some “substantial goal”
of the state.119 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that Texas’s
concern over illegal immigration did not give the state the
authority to deprive children of an education.120
The Plyler decision gave education advocates new fodder for
challenges under the Equal Protection clause of the Constitution
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 230 (“It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by
promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries,
surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. It is thus
clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these children an education, they
are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs involved to these children, the State, and the
Nation.”).
119 Id. at 224.
120 Id. at 224-25.
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when it could be shown that students experienced a “deprivation
of education.”121 In reaching this decision, the Court resurrected
the rationale it used in another education case, Lau v. Nichols,122
which was decided the year following Rodriguez. There, Chinesespeaking students brought a claim under section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits any entity receiving federal
assistance from discriminating against certain groups.123 The
students argued that the San Francisco school system’s policy of
providing non-English language instruction to approximately
1,800 students of Chinese ancestry who did not speak English
violated the statute.124
The Court did not consider an Equal Protection claim,125 but did
find for the plaintiffs on their Civil Rights Act claim after it
determined that California’s imposed standards did not provide
equality of treatment.126 The Court explained that equality is not
achieved “merely by providing students with the same facilities,
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum,” because students who do not
understand English are “effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education.”127 Subsequently, the Court in Plyler
transformed the Lau decision’s “effective foreclosure”128 reasoning
for Civil Rights Act violations into its “deprivation of education”
121 Id. at 205.
122 Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
123 “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,

be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West).
124 Lau, 414 U.S. at 563.
125 The plaintiff’s in the Lau case were discouraged by the Court’s decision in Rodriguez
and made the strategic decision to drop their Equal protection claim after it became clear
that the Supreme Court would not consider education a fundamental right. ROSEMARY
SALOMONE, TRUE AMERICAN 126 (2010).
126 Lau, 414 U.S. at 566.
127 Id.
128 The concept of “effective foreclosure” was actually introduced by Judge Hufstedler
in his dissent from the majority opinion in the 9th Circuit’s decision in Lau. Interestingly,
this description was used to support his belief that the California law was unconstitutional
(“Access to education offered by the public schools is completely foreclosed to these children
who cannot comprehend any of it. They are functionally deaf and mute. Their plight is not
a matter of constitutional concern, according to the majority opinion, because no state
action or invidious discrimination is present. The majority opinion says that state action is
absent because the state did not directly or indirectly cause the children’s ‘language
deficiency’, and that discrimination is not invidious because the state offers the same
instruction to all children. Both premises are wrong.”). Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 805
(9th Cir. 1973), rev’d, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
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reasoning for Equal Protection claims. Because Supreme Court
precedent suggests physical exclusion may not be required for all
violations of the Equal Protection clause, it may be possible for a
state to violate the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing ineffective
teachers to remain in the classroom.
B. The “Rodriguez Loophole”
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has not recognized
education as a fundamental right, but it has consistently affirmed
the responsibility of the states to ensure that their public
education system is not depriving students of minimal educational
opportunities.129 Arguably, the egregious deprivation of
educational benefits suffered by the plaintiffs in Vergara fall into
this category of exceptional situations where a strict scrutiny
analysis130 of education statutes is appropriate. Not only has the
Vergara decision sent shockwaves through California,131 but also
other states with similar employment statutes are contemplating
similar challenges.132
The Rodriguez “loophole” was created in that decision’s dicta
and was later more intricately defined in Plyler. The Rodriguez
majority did not find that Texas’s poor minority students
experienced “an absolute denial of educational opportunities”
based solely upon “relative differences in spending levels.”133
Therefore, the Court held that “no charge fairly could be made that
the system fails to provide each child with an opportunity to
acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.”134
This reasoning implies that if students did experience an “absolute
129 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“education prepares individuals
to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society”).
130 Education statutes that are shown to have a disproportionate discriminatory effect
are constitutional only if they utilize “rational” means in achieving a “substantial goal of
the State.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
131 Mark E. Brossman, Scott A. Gold, and Donna Lazarus, Court Finds California
Teacher Tenure Laws Unconstitutional, 28 No. 26 WESTLAW J. EMP., 1 (2014).
132 See id. at 3 (“Although the court’s decision reaches only California public schools,
the Vergara case may be the first of many court and legislative challenges to tenure”); see
also A New Battle for Equal Education: In California, a Judge Takes on Teacher Tenure,
N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/opinion/in-california-ajudge-takes-on-teacher-tenure.
133 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
134 Id.
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denial of educational opportunities” that prevented them from
enjoyment of their rights of speech and of full participation in the
political process,135 those students would have a valid equal
protection claim.
The Plyler Court further expanded this “loophole” by first
reinforcing the importance of education using strong language.
The Court identified several detrimental consequences associated
with the denial of education including “the stigma of illiteracy”
that follow students for the rest of their lives, the denial of “the
ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions,” and,
ultimately, the foreclosure of “any realistic possibility that they
will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our
Nation.”136 Not only does the denial of education to an isolated
group impact our politics and culture, but it also runs contrary to
the equality of opportunity the Equal Protection clause
guarantees.137
The Court viewed the Equal Protection clause as the mechanism
that abolishes “governmental barriers presenting unreasonable
obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit.”138
Thus, by depriving a disfavored group of educational
opportunities, states are also denying “the means” by which that
group may improve its standing among the entire population.139
Given the extraordinary negative effects accompanying the denial
of education, the Plyler Court determined that any statutes that
cause such a denial must be rationally related to a “substantial
goal” pursued by the state.140

135 The Supreme Court has often viewed quality education as a necessity to
participation in the political process. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)
(“some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence”);
see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (“public schools . . . inculcat[e] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system”).
136 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
137 See id. at 221-22.
138 Id. at 222.
139 Id.
140 See id. at 224.
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RODRIGUEZ, PLYLER, AND LAU AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR VERGARA

The Vergara plaintiffs based their Equal Protection claim on the
California Constitution’s recognition of education as a
fundamental right. However, this argument would fail in federal
court because the Supreme Court has not recognized education as
a federal fundamental right deserving of strict scrutiny.
Therefore, any eventual federal challenge to California’s teacher
employment protection statutes will have to follow the route
created by Rodriguez, Plyler, and Lau. Such a challenge will force
federal courts to apply the constitutional principles developed in
the cases of equality of educational opportunity to the examination
of the quality of educational experience provided to certain
students.
The first step for the Vergara plaintiffs in developing their Equal
Protection claim is to argue that students in the Los Angeles
Unified School District have had their educational opportunities
“denied”141 or “effectively foreclosed.”142 The Vergara case is a
remarkable example of an education challenge because it asked
the court to find a correlation between teacher quality and the
denial of equal educational opportunities.143 The Vergara court
concluded that the most important factor in a student’s
educational success is the quality of the teaching he or she
receives.144 The court found that the evidence tying grossly
ineffective teachers to student performance and learning

141 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (“The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social,
economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of the individual, and the obstacle it
poses to individual achievement, make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle
of a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause.”)
142 Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (“Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of
treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and
curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any
meaningful education.”).
143 Haley Sweetland Edwards, The War on Teacher Tenure, TIME (Oct. 30 2014),
http://time.com/3533556/the-war-on-teacher-tenure
(“Bad
teachers
‘substantially
undermine’ a child’s education. That, [Judge] Treu wrote, not only ‘shocks the conscience’
but also violates the students’ right to a ‘basic equality of educational opportunity’ as
enshrined in California’s constitution.”).
144 See Vergara, No. BC484642 2014 WL 2598719 at *4 (Cal.Super. June 10, 2014).
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regression was not only compelling but that it “shock[ed] the
conscience.”145
The California Superior Court was not engaging in exaggerated
hyperbole. The plaintiffs provided evidence that students are not
only less likely to succeed when taught by a single grossly
ineffective teacher, but that those students end up significantly
behind their peers and may never recover.146 By demonstrating a
strong connection between teacher effectiveness and student
performance, the plaintiffs convinced the court to gauge teacher
quality by evaluating student success in the classroom.147
For instance, Dr. Kane148 testified that students in the Los
Angeles Unified School District who were taught by a teacher in
the bottom 5 percent of competence lost approximately 9.54
months of learning in English Language Arts compared to
students with average quality teachers.149 Students taught by
grossly ineffective teachers lose approximately 11.73 months of
learning in Mathematics in comparison to their peers.150 Dr.
Chetty151 conducted a study that revealed that one grossly
ineffective teacher costs a classroom of 28 children a total of $1.4
million in lifetime earnings.152 Just like the Chinese-speaking
students in Lau who did not learn because they were taught only
in English, the plaintiffs in Vergara did not learn because of
grossly ineffective teachers.153 Beatriz Vergara, the named
plaintiff, described three of her teachers as apathetic, verbally
abusive or simply ineffective.154 In describing her math teacher,
she testified that “[i]t was always loud in there, and [he] would

145 Id.
146 Evidence, Findings of Fact: The Importance of Teachers, STUDENTSMATTER.ORG,

available at http://studentsmatter.org/case/vergara/importance-of-teachers/.
147 Id. School districts assess teacher effectiveness using many methods, including:
standardized tests, other objective measures of student performance, systemic and
replicable teacher observations, and student surveys.
148 See STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 27.
149 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 21.
150 Id.
151 See supra note 29.
152 Id.
153 See Lau, 414 U.S. at 563 (“The failure of the San Francisco school system to provide
English language instruction to approximately 1,800 students of Chinese ancestry who do
not speak English, or to provide them with other adequate instructional procedures, denies
them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the public educational program”).
154 See Haley Sweetland Edwards, supra note 143.
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even sleep during class,” and that “[h]e didn’t even teach, and he
couldn’t control his class. I couldn’t hear anything because of how
loud it was.”155 Therefore, students were able to prove that grossly
ineffective teachers denied them significant educational
opportunities and they may never overcome the disadvantages
created by those teachers.
After demonstrating adequate evidence of denial of educational
opportunities, the next step in an Equal Protection claim is to
prove that the presence of grossly ineffective teachers has an
unequal effect on students. In addition to the immediate
educational losses, the students face a variety of other
disadvantages that will hold them back for the rest of their
lives.156 The court’s decision made clear that grossly ineffective
teachers overwhelmingly disadvantage poor minority students.157
The plaintiffs again presented quite strong evidence in support of
this portion of their claim. The court relied heavily on one piece of
evidence, a 2007 study performed by the California Department of
Education, which concluded:
Unfortunately, the most vulnerable students, those
attending high-poverty, low-performing schools, are far
more likely than their wealthier peers to attend schools
having a disproportionate number of underqualified,
inexperienced, out-of-field, and ineffective teachers and
administrators.
Because
minority
children
disproportionately attend such schools, minority students
bear the brunt of staffing inequalities.158
In addition to the 2007 study, the plaintiffs introduced empirical
evidence demonstrating the significant achievement gaps between
white students and African-American and Latino students in
155 Id.
156 STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 146, (“Teacher effectiveness influences long-term

student outcomes, including the likelihood that a child will attend university, the quality
of the university that the child will attend, the amount of the child’s future earnings, the
likelihood of the child becoming pregnant as a teenager, the quality of the neighborhood in
which the child will live, and the amount the child will save for retirement.”).
157 Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
10, 2014) (“Plaintiffs have proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Challenged
Statutes impose a real and appreciable impact on students’ fundamental right to equality
of education and that they impose a disproportionate burden on poor and minority
students.”).
158 Id. at *7–8 (quoting CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., Evaluating Progress Toward Equitable
Distribution (2007)).
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California.159 The evidence included measurements of high school
graduation rates within four years, high school dropout rates, and
proficiency in English-Language Arts and mathematics.160 A
strikingly similar achievement gap exists between low-income
students and non-low-income students in California.161 It was not
a coincidence, the plaintiffs argued, that ineffective and grossly
ineffective teachers are disproportionately located in areas with
minority-majority and low-income school districts.162 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs were able to prove the disparate educational and
lifetime impact the teacher employment protection statutes have
on poor minority students.
However, the inquiry does not end once the plaintiffs
demonstrate that the statutes deny educational opportunities and
have a disparate impact on poor and minority students. California
may overcome strict scrutiny analysis by providing evidence that
the statutes are a “rational means” of achieving a “substantial
goal” of the State.163 At the Vergara trial, the statutes were
examined under California’s strict scrutiny standard, which
requires the state to identify a “compelling interest” served by each
statute and the statutes are necessary to further that interest.164
Throughout the trial, California struggled to identify compelling
state interests served by the Permanent Employment Statute, the
Dismissal Statutes, and the LIFO statute. Ultimately, the
defendants argued that the statutes served the state’s compelling
interest in preserving the due process rights of its teachers.165
Advocates of generous teacher tenure laws argue such systems
prevent school districts from firing teachers based on salary,
personal beliefs, biased students, or administrator evaluations,
159 STUDENTS MATTER, Findings of Fact: Disparate Impact on Low-Income and
Minority Students (August 27, 2014), http://studentsmatter.org/evidence/#findings-of-factdisparate-impact-on-low-income-and-minority-students.
160 See id.
161 Id.
162 Id. (ineffective teachers tend to “accumulate” in low-income and minority districts
because it is costly, time-consuming, and burdensome to dismiss tenured teachers under
the Dismissal Statutes and ineffective teachers in moderate income and white districts are
commonly transferred into these districts).
163 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
164 Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 2598719, at *1 (Cal. Super.).
165 See Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 194 (1975) (holding that a teacher’s
position is a property right and due process attaches when disciplinary action is
considered).
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and allow teachers to focus on teaching rather than job security.166
Additionally, the state has a compelling interest in attracting
qualified teachers and less generous tenure systems would hinder
recruitment.167 In evaluating the state interest served by the
Permanent Employment Statute, the court took issue with the
very limited time period for teacher evaluations for tenure
offers.168 The court remarked, “both students and teachers are
unfairly, unnecessarily, and for no legally cognizable reason
disadvantaged by the current Permanent Employment
Statute.”169 As for the Dismissal Statutes, California argued that
it had a compelling interest in protecting its teachers’ right to due
process in the termination process.170
The court agreed that teachers are entitled to due process
protections, but rejected California’s overly protective statutes as
examples of uber due process.171
Finally, the court held
California’s interest in its LIFO policy was the least supportable
of all its teacher employment statutes. In criticizing California’s
“unfathomable and therefore constitutionally unsupportable
position,” the court found that there was no “compelling interest
in the de facto separation of students from competent teachers,
and a like interest in the de facto retention of incompetent
ones.”172 A federal challenge would substitute the “compelling
interest” standard for the Plyler “substantial goal” requirement.
Such a substitution does little to alter the burden of proof required
to overcome the disproportional negative impact LIFO has on
students. Thus, it is likely that the justifications asserted in the
California Superior Court would not qualify as serving a
“substantial goal” of the state.
Simply applying the reasoning of the California Superior Court
to Supreme Court precedent does not accurately predict a federal
166 See Eltman, supra note 3.
167 Id. Other arguments include: tenure prevents hired paid teachers from being fired

in favor of less expensive new teachers, tenure helps innovation in the profession, teacher
tenure is an accomplishment achieved after several positive evaluations, tenure allows
teachers to teach controversial material, tenure encourages careful hiring decisions.
168 Supra note 5, at 5.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. (“The evidence this Court heard was that it could take anywhere from two to
almost ten years and cost $50,000 to $450,000 or more to bring these cases to conclusion
under the Dismissal Statutes”).
172 Id. at 6.
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challenge. Additional research into the potential correlation
between teacher employment protection statutes and the
disproportionate denial of education is necessary to provide better
evidence of the connection. However, the evidence presented in
Vergara suggests that a very real problem exists in schools where
grossly ineffective teachers cannot be fired. The court found the
evidence formidable and attributed the denial of equal educational
opportunities to ineffective teachers. As the court stated, grossly
ineffective teachers have “a direct, real, appreciable, and negative
impact on a significant number of California students.”173 Even if
the trial court’s decision is reversed and a federal challenge to
California’s teacher protection statutes is never pursued, the
California legislature should rewrite its laws to better ensure
equality in educational opportunities.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE CALIFORNIA
STATUTES

Until the Vergara case completes the appeals process, the
California legislature has no reason to alter the teacher
employment protection statutes that were found unconstitutional
by the trial court. However, if the Superior Court’s decision on the
unconstitutionality of the statutes is ultimately upheld, or if a
federal challenge is brought and succeeds, the California
education system will have to rewrite its statutes to comply with
the California and U.S. Constitutions. U.S. Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan referred to the decision as a “mandate” and
encouraged states to “build a new framework” to fix the problems
in public education.174 Fortunately, the revisions necessary to
exclude grossly ineffective teachers from teaching positions can be
tailored to fit the problems that exist in each individual state.175

173 Vergara v. California, NO. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *4 (Cal. Super. June 10,
2014), rev’d 246 Cal.App. 4th 619 (2016).
174 See Press Release, Arne Duncan, U.S. Secretary of Education, Statement from U.S.
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. California (June
10, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-education-arneduncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-califo.
175 States can look to other states for ideas on a range of issues related to education
reform.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis used the phrase Laboratories of
democracy to describe how a “state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
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In 2012, a bi-partisan effort in the New Jersey legislature
enacted massive reforms to the state’s public teacher employment
statutes to ensure effective teachers in all classrooms.176 The
evaluation period for tenure decisions was increased from three to
four years.177 Additionally, a tenured teacher who receives poor
performance evaluations for two consecutive years can be
dismissed.178 If a tenured teacher is dismissed, the new laws limit
the appeals process to 105 days.179 New Jersey’s reforms are not
a template for improving teacher quality, but they are informative
when considering revisions to education systems in different
states.
In the Vergara opinion, Judge Rolf M. Treu offered more
examples of constitutional alternatives to the statutes challenged
in Vergara. Regarding the Permanent Employment Statute, the
court focused on evidence showing that 32 states have a three year
evaluation period before tenure offers are made, and nine states
have four or five year periods.180 The court also pointed to
California’s own experts who agreed that between three to five
years would be a better time period to make the tenure decision;
this would benefit both the students and teachers.181 Other
experts corroborate this view and suggest that a minimum of two
years of classroom experience is needed before a teacher can be
properly evaluated.182 Therefore, an alteration to the current
California Employment Statute that allows for a minimum of two
full years of academic experience before an offer of tenure would
ensure it passes constitutional requirements.
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
176 Rachel Monahan, Christie gets tough on tenure, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2012,
http://nydailynews.com/new-york/education/new-jersey-gov-chris-christie-tough-teachertenure-new-law-requires-educators-work-years-reach-status.article-1.1130359.
177 See id. Teachers must also receive positive evaluations two years in a row before a
tenure offer can be extended.
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See Vergara v. California, NO. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719, at *5 (Cal. Super. June
10, 2014), rev’d 246 Cal.App. 4th 619 (2016).
181 See id.
182 Heather Peske & Kati Haycock, Teaching Inequality: How Poor and Minority
Students Are Shortchanged on Teacher Quality 8 (The Education Trust, 2006),
http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/TQReportJune2006.pdf (“The evidence is
incontrovertible that experience makes teachers more effective. Most research suggests
that teachers are considerably more effective after completing two years on the job”).
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In revising the Dismissal statutes, the principal goal should be
to limit the time and money required to terminate an ineffective
teacher so that all districts are capable of making those decisions
when required. School districts are forced to lay-off employees for
many reasons including budget insufficiencies, declines in student
populations, and changes to existing educational programs.183
Thus, circumstances arise where teachers must be let go.
However, teachers are guaranteed the right to Due Process in
termination proceedings.184 However, the Vergara court was
correct in describing the current dismissal procedures as uber due
process.185 To effectively balance due process considerations and
the need to efficiently remove grossly ineffective teachers from the
classroom, the California legislature can revise the Dismissal
Statutes to treat teachers like other public school employees.
The Vergara court found that California school districts face far
fewer hurdles in terminating other school district classified
employees.186 However, school district classified employees and
teachers (certified employees) have equal due process rights under
the California Constitution.187 The evidence presented by the
plaintiffs demonstrated that the process of terminating other
public school employees, other than teachers, is far less time
consuming and expensive, but also weakens job security.188
Striking the proper balance between protection of teachers’ due
process rights and school districts’ interests in removing
ineffective teachers is a delicate endeavor and will be subject to
much contention. At a minimum, teachers should receive a formal
hearing and be afforded an appellate review by the state court
system to determine whether the evidence supporting the
183 Evidence, Findings of Fact: LIFO Statute, STUDENTS MATTER, available at
http://studentsmatter.org/evidence/#findings-of-fact-the-lifo-statute.
184 See State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (finding that there is no requirement
that teachers be offered tenure, but once they are offered tenure, 14th Amendment Due
Process considerations become attached to that employment.).
185 See Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 at *2 (Cal. Super. Jun.
10, 2014); see also Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 194 (1975) (holding that the
California Constitution mandates that teachers be accorded certain due process procedures
before discipline becomes effective).
186 See Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 at *5 (Cal. Super. Jun.
10, 2014).
187 See Skelly, 15 Cal.3d at 215.
188 See Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 2598719 at *5 (Cal. Super. Jun.
10, 2014).
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termination is sufficient.189 Ultimately, California’s new statutory
framework for teacher dismissals must allow even the poorest
school district to remove a teacher in a timely and cost-effective
manner.
The most contentious yet most problematic California education
statute that will have to be brought into conformity with
constitutional requirements is the LIFO statute. Basing layoffs on
seniority is a poor method for any school district to use because
there is no correlation between teacher effectiveness and seniority
level.190 Furthermore, the current system in California calculates
seniority based on the number of years the teacher has been in the
district and not the teacher’s overall experience as a teacher.191
The financial impact on all California school districts is also
significant because seniority-based layoffs lead to the newest,
lowest-paid teachers being dismissed, and the tenured, higherpaid (possibly ineffective) teachers being kept.192
Seniority should not be the sole determining factor in making
layoff decisions. Instead, California should adopt a system that
weighs teacher effectiveness against other considerations such as
seniority and potential for success. There are many methods to
evaluate teacher effectiveness. The value-added approach gauges
teacher effectiveness by evaluating the students’ improvements on
standardized math and English tests.193 This method of
evaluation was incorporated into the Common Core Standards
Initiative and has proven tremendously controversial.194 Testing
should gauge student growth and not hold students to a specific
standard based on grade level. For instance, a sixth grade English
teacher, who improves a student’s reading level from third grade
189
190
191
192

Id. at *6.
See STUDENTS MATTER, supra note 183.
Id.
See The Case Against Quality-Blind Teacher Layoffs, Why Layoff Policies that
Ignore Teacher Quality Need to End Now, THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT (Feb. 2011),
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011.pd
f; see also Felch, supra note 33, at 1.
193 See Felch, supra note 33, at 1.
194 See generally Common Core State Standards Initiative, Frequently Asked
Questions, Common Core State Standards (2016), http://www.corestandards.org/about-thestandards/frequently-asked-questions/; cf. Jesse Rothstein, Teacher Quality in Educational
Production: Tracking, Decay, and Student Achievement, 125 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS 75, 210 (2010) (finding the assumptions in the value-added method of
evaluation to be substantially incorrect).
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to fifth grade will be penalized in evaluations based on grade level
performance. Therefore, testing would more accurately reflect
teacher effectiveness if it were conducted at the beginning and end
of the year using tests of equal difficulty.
A more effective method of evaluation places some emphasis on
testing but also utilizes student evaluations and classroom
observations.195 Ideally, teacher evaluations, processes, and
testing methods will be determined and implemented by the local
school districts because the creators will be closest to the teachers,
familiar with the community, and directly accountable to the
public.196 Furthermore, school district officials can be held
accountable when residents are dissatisfied with the educational
outcomes they are receiving.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The California Superior Court’s decision in Vergara v.
California may be remembered as a pivotal point in education
jurisprudence. However, its full implications are not yet clear.
Vergara held that poor minority students are being denied access
to educational opportunities in states with education statutes
similar to those currently in effect in California. The decision
should be considered a call to reform teacher employment
protection statutes in California and other states where education
laws make it possible for grossly ineffective teachers to remain in
classrooms. Public education reform depends on how effective
state legislatures are at addressing the problem of grossly
ineffective teachers. Without evaluating the quality of the
delivery of educational benefits, changes to curriculum and testing
standards are futile. If students are being denied equal access to
educational opportunities because of grossly ineffective teachers,
this area of litigation is sure to grow over the coming years.
Proof of the correlation between teacher effectiveness and
student performance is key to future federal challenges.
195 See generally, Teacher Evaluation 2.0, THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT (2010),
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/Teacher-Evaluation-Oct10F.pdf.
196 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education
in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.”).
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Moreover, determining how to accurately gauge teacher
effectiveness is sure to be another source of contention in future
litigation. However, the Vergara plaintiffs were able to introduce
an overwhelming amount of evidence demonstrating how grossly
ineffective teachers are depriving their students of educational
opportunities. Such striking evidence is appealing for a potential
federal challenge by the same plaintiffs or similarly situated
plaintiffs.
Additionally, the national attention created by the Vergara
decision has inflamed passions among labor unions and education
reform advocates. Education is one of the most important
functions of state government, and diverse parties have differing
views on how to improve public education. The passionate
advocates on both sides and importance of the issue make it more
likely for Vergara or a similar case to be brought in federal court.
Rodriguez and Plyler hinted at the Supreme Court’s willingness to
at least consider a non-physical denial as a violation of equal
protection. If California’s current system ultimately prevails in
state court, it is not certain whether Vergara will be brought into
federal court. For now, California’s current teacher employment
laws are in limbo as the case is pending appeal.197 Similar suits,
like the one brought in New York, may be brought in other states
as well. Regardless of the California Supreme Court’s decision,
the trial court’s decision in Vergara was consequential and helped
refocus the education reform debate on the impact and
constitutionality of overly protective teacher employment
protection statutes.

197 See
Vergara
v.
California:
Timeline,
http://studentsmatter.org/case/vergara/timeline/.
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